The ASEAN Leaders’ Declaration on Maritime Cooperation should be read for what it is: not a replacement for the long-delayed South China Sea Code of Conduct, but ASEAN’s attempt to build a wider maritime architecture before the COC finally emerges, if it ever does in a meaningful form.
At its core, the declaration signals that ASEAN no longer wants maritime issues to be viewed narrowly as territorial disputes. The sea is not only about competing claims, rocks, reefs, and patrol ships. It is also about navigation, maritime safety, coast guard coordination, search and rescue, fishing, marine pollution, critical underwater infrastructure, blue economy development, ocean governance, and maritime domain awareness. In other words, ASEAN is trying to broaden the conversation from confrontation to governance.
This is classic ASEAN diplomacy. The bloc moves where consensus is possible and avoids forcing all members into one rigid position. The declaration, therefore, allows ASEAN to project unity on functional maritime cooperation without demanding identical geopolitical postures from all members.
Its purpose is threefold. First, it gives ASEAN a common maritime language rooted in international law, including UNCLOS, while reaffirming ASEAN Centrality, sovereignty, non-interference, and an international law-based regional framework. Second, it strengthens ASEAN’s preparedness for maritime crises, ranging from gray-zone encounters and accidental collisions to environmental damage and disruptions to sea lanes. Third, it places legal and diplomatic discipline back at the center of maritime politics by calling for an effective and substantive COC consistent with international law.
This is where the proposed Philippines-based ASEAN Maritime Center becomes significant. The Center will likely function not as a military command post but as a hub for coordination, research, information sharing, and capacity building. Its role will be to support ASEAN and ASEAN-led mechanisms, promote cross-sectoral collaboration, and avoid duplicating existing bodies.
Practically, the Center may focus on maritime domain awareness, information sharing among ASEAN members, coordination among coast guards and maritime law enforcement agencies, policy research, capacity building on UNCLOS, search and rescue, environmental protection, IUU fishing, maritime safety, and support for the ASEAN Maritime Outlook. Its value lies in connecting ASEAN’s political-security, economic, and socio-cultural pillars, because maritime issues today are no longer purely security concerns. They are also about trade, energy, food security, climate resilience, infrastructure, and development.
But there is also a risk. Since the Center will be based in the Philippines, it might be viewed with suspicion, especially if external partners become too dominant. ASEAN must therefore keep the Center genuinely ASEAN-led, technically credible, and insulated from bloc politics.
Moreover, the declaration may indirectly help the COC process, but it will not magically conclude it. The hardest issues remain political: whether the COC will be legally binding, what geographic areas it will cover, how clearly it will be anchored in UNCLOS, whether it will restrict third-party military cooperation, and whether it will include enforcement or dispute-management mechanisms. Indeed, the COC remains trapped in difficult bargaining, but maritime cooperation cannot wait.
Source: The Lobbyist
https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/building-order-at-sea-while-the-scs-coc-remains-adrift
