Redrawing the battle lines: Is PH a pawn in Taiwan Strait gamble?


OVER the past two weeks, the Philippines has been besieged by a barrage of controversies and crises, each more damning than the last. First, there’s the 20-percent tax on savings, a policy that punishes the modest aspirations of ordinary Filipinos under the guise of fiscal reform. Then came the revelation of Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr.’s alleged secret Maltese citizenship, an issue that raises red flags about national loyalty at the highest echelons of defense leadership. Simultaneously, the suspicious death of Paolo Tantoco, allegedly from a cocaine overdose, with whispered insinuations implicating the first lady, among others, has further fueled public distrust, especially in the eerie silence from Malacañang quarters.

On the geopolitical front, a July 14 exposé by the Washington Post revealed that the Philippines and Taiwan are “quietly” deepening security ties against the backdrop of the so-called China threat, while a USNI News article from July 9 states that the US Army is expanding its presence in the Philippines. This military buildup coincides with Washington’s pressure on its allies, Japan and Australia, to disclose what roles they will play in the event of war over Taiwan.

And through it all? Malacañang remains conspicuously silent. No substantial clarifications and explanations, and certainly no transparency and accountability. It’s as if the administration hopes that by no explanations, the nation might simply forget. But silence, in moments of national consequence, speaks volumes, especially when what’s at stake is sovereignty, transparency, accountability and the integrity of the Republic.

Manila-Taipei security cooperation

The Philippines is quietly but significantly recalibrating its foreign and security policy by deepening informal defense cooperation with Taiwan, drawing itself closer to the center of US-China tensions. Joint patrols in the Bashi Channel, Taiwanese personnel participation in behind-the-scenes planning and observation during joint military exercises, including the recent US-Philippines-Japan “Kamandag” drills in the Batanes islands, and Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s policy shift allowing visa-free entry and official engagement with Taiwanese counterparts all indicate a growing operational alignment. While framed as economic and diplomatic outreach, these moves blur the line of Manila’s adherence to the One-China policy and risk entangling the country in a geopolitical fault line.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s reaction has been swift and Spartan. Beijing has accused the Philippines of acting as a “co-conspirator” in the US-led containment strategy, warning Manila against “playing with fire” over Taiwan. Such rhetoric, while not new, has grown sharper as the Philippines moves increasingly toward a departure from mere hedging to strategic alignment.

The implications are far-reaching. Manila still claims to adhere to the One-China policy, but its actions suggest a growing de facto convergence with Taipei on strategic matters. This ambiguity, perhaps deliberate, risks not only exacerbating tensions with China but also unsettling Asean, an organization deeply wary of bloc politics and committed to nonalignment and neutrality.

Hence, the Philippines is navigating a dangerous tightrope. By embedding itself deeper in the Taiwan flash point, the Philippines risks being drawn into the center of the US-China rivalry/confrontation, whether it is ready or not.

From being an ally to a launchpad?

In retrospect, on the high-stakes geopolitical chessboard of the Asia/Indo-Pacific, the Philippines is no longer a passive observer. Rather, it is being actively repositioned, whether by strategic choice or by alliance inertia, as a potential launchpad and forward base in the event of a US-China military confrontation, particularly over Taiwan.

What’s unfolding is not mere military cooperation, but a transformation of the Philippines into a frontline state in a rivalry it neither initiated nor may ultimately control nor can afford.

The expansion of US access under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), along with reports of long-range missile systems being quietly pre-positioned, is indicative of this shift. The US Army’s expanding presence in the country is part of a larger military reconfiguration across the first island chain, with the Philippines becoming the linchpin. Advanced weapons systems, such as the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System), naval strike missiles, or NMESIS (Navy‑Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System), a land-based anti-ship missile system, and the more provocative Typhon missile platform, have either been deployed during military exercises or are being considered for rotational, permanent or semi-permanent basing.

The euphemisms of “mutual defense” and “interoperability” veil a more sobering reality: the Philippines is being militarily refashioned into an American forward operating base, a floating US aircraft carrier by geography. With EDCA sites strategically located in Cagayan, Palawan and Isabela, the architecture of this design becomes unmistakable. These sites are situated adjacent to two of the world’s most volatile flash points, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea (SCS), aligning Manila’s defense posture increasingly with Washington’s Indo-Pacific containment strategy against China.

But such alignment is not without consequence. China has repeatedly and publicly warned that any stationing of offensive US weaponry within its periphery and playing with fire on the Taiwan issue would be treated as a provocation. In the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the SCS, EDCA sites like Cagayan and Palawan could swiftly become legitimate “second or first-strike targets” of China’s precision-guided missiles, the likes of the feared “Dong Feng” missiles technology series. Unlike the Cold War paradigm, geography is no longer a shield. Distance, in an era of hypersonic and satellite-guided weaponry, offers no sanctuary.

Thus, while the Marcos administration may portray this expanded alliance as a means of strengthening national defense, the deeper Manila embeds itself into the US military architecture, the more its strategic autonomy and sovereignty erode. The critical question arises: has the Philippines, in effect, signed on to Washington’s Indo-Pacific doctrine, including potential intervention in a Taiwan scenario?

Even without formal US bases, the rotational presence and pre-positioning of American forces and military assets on Philippine soil effectively render the country a component of America’s extended military web. What is absent from this arrangement is the veto power, meaning there’s no clear guarantee that the Philippines can prevent its territory from being used in scenarios not of its choosing.

In sum, the Philippines is at an inflection point. From archipelagic state to arsenal hub, it is drifting toward becoming a platform for great-power competition. This trajectory, unless recalibrated, risks not only dragging the country into a confrontation it cannot afford and compromising its survival and the very sovereignty and independence it seeks to defend.

Conclusion

Indeed, while safeguarding national defense is an inherent sovereign duty, transforming the Philippines into a de facto missile outpost, an ammunition hub, or a forward operating base in the event of a US-China clash is a perilous strategic gamble.

Militarization may offer the illusion of deterrence, but in reality, it invites entanglement. The Philippines must resist becoming a pawn in a larger great-power rivalry and instead recalibrate its foreign policy toward strategic balancing, anchored in regional diplomacy, economic diversification and nonalignment. True national interest lies not in building missile silos under the guise of interoperability, but in asserting agency through peaceful engagement and sovereign pragmatism.

Because once you’re caught in the crossfire, it no longer matters who pulled the trigger first or who fired the first shot, only who gets burned.

Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/07/19/opinion/columns/redrawing-the-battle-lines-is-ph-a-pawn-in-taiwan-strait-gamble/2152061

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD), Peking University, Beijing, China. Currently, she is a Senior Researcher of the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) and a Senior Research Fellow of the Global Governance Institution (GGI). Prof. Anna Uy taught Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, Southeast Asia, and China Studies. She is a researcher-writer, academic, and consultant on a wide array of issues. She has worked as a consultant with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other local and international NGOs.