Is history repeating itself? Is EO 81 a prelude to martial law?

EXECUTIVE Order (EO) 81, signed by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. on Dec. 30, 2024, introduces a significant reorganization of the National Security Council (NSC). The directive notably excludes Vice President Sara Duterte and the country’s surviving former presidents — Joseph Estrada, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Rodrigo Duterte — from the council’s membership, signaling a departure from previous inclusivity practices.

Traditionally, former presidents have been integral members of the NSC, serving as advisers who contribute invaluable insights drawn from their extensive experience in governance and national security. Their involvement brings institutional memory and lessons from past administrations, which can provide continuity and historical context to current security policies. The exclusion of former presidents and even the vice president from the NSC could narrow the range of perspectives considered in critical decision-making processes.

This political development has sparked discussions about Marcos Jr.’s intent, which is perceived by many as a move to concentrate power and decision-making authority. Hence, EO 81 raises questions about the broader implications for inclusivity and democratic consultation in policymaking, especially on national security matters. By sidelining former presidents and the incumbent vice president with unique perspectives, the Marcos government may risk limiting the diversity of thought needed to navigate complex security challenges effectively. Historically, diverse perspectives have been essential for balanced policymaking, especially on national security concerns.

Indeed, EO 81 is not only a break from tradition but signals a departure from the inclusive and consultative nature of previous NSC compositions, which leveraged the insights of past leaders. It is also indicative of the politicization of the NSC and political polarization. More significantly, this shift raises concerns and warrants careful scrutiny, as it draws potential parallels to historical precedents under Ferdinand Marcos Sr.’s authoritarian regime during the martial law era. The centralization of power and authority, and the exclusion of diverse perspectives evoke reminders of policies during that time, prioritizing executive control over consultative and democratic governance. Indeed, all these prompt reflections on the importance of preserving democratic norms and processes, and ensuring that national security measures remain transparent, inclusive and accountable to prevent any erosion of institutional checks and balances. Thus, EO 81 invites reflection on the value of inclusive, well-rounded decision-making in safeguarding national interests and security.

Implications

A critical concern arising from EO 81 is the potential concentration and centralization of power within the executive branch, particularly in the hands of the president. By restricting the composition of the NSC to current officials aligned with the administration, the executive effectively strengthens its control over national security matters while curtailing opportunities for dissent within the council. This strategic narrowing of NSC membership ensures that decision-making processes align more closely with the current regime’s agenda, potentially prioritizing political considerations over diverse perspectives.

The exclusion of the vice president, a position traditionally involved in national security deliberations, further underscores this shift toward consolidating authority within the presidency. Such moves reflect a broader trend toward centralization and concentration of power, raising important questions about the implications for checks and balances, the inclusivity of critical decision-making processes, and the long-term consequences for democratic governance. This development invites scrutiny, especially in a country with a history of overcentralizing power and authoritarian rule during the martial law era of Marcos Sr.

Moreover, the exclusion of Sara Duterte from the NSC, amid reported political tensions with Marcos Jr., his cousin, the House Speaker Martin Romualdez, and the President’s political allies in both houses of Congress, raises concerns about the use of the NSC as a political tool and highlights the potential influence of political considerations in shaping the council’s composition. This move could be interpreted as consolidating authority and sidelining dissenting voices within the government. Also, such a move raises questions about whether the reorganization of the NSC serves purely strategic and operational purposes or if it reflects a broader political agenda aimed at consolidating power within a more aligned executive structure. Furthermore, removing the vice president and former presidents from the NSC signals political motives rather than a legal mandate. Such developments underscore the complex interplay between governance, institutional dynamics and political rivalries, particularly in contexts where national security policies intersect with internal political struggles among various political actors.

Historical parallelism and context

While EO 81, at this point, conclusively does not directly signal an imminent declaration of martial law, its implications and structural changes bear significant parallels to the actions taken by Marcos Sr. before the declaration of martial law in 1972. These historical echoes merit careful scrutiny in light of their potential consequences for democratic governance.

Before imposing martial law, Marcos Sr. implemented systematic measures to consolidate power and authority. This included centralizing control over key institutions, marginalizing dissenting voices and cultivating a climate of fear and perceived national crisis. Notable steps included the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, enabling warrantless arrests, and curbing legal protections for critics and opposition figures. There was also a manipulation of constitutional processes. Marcos Sr. sought to replace the 1935 Constitution and implemented the 1973 Constitution to extend his presidency and expand executive powers, undermining the checks and balances integral to democratic governance.

The NSC composition under Marcos Sr. was designed to function as an advisory body for national security matters. However, it had become a rubber-stamp institution. Marcos Sr. bypassed broader institutional input, concentrating decision-making within a trusted inner circle of military, government officials and civilian allies. Dissenting voices from political opposition, the media and civil society were excluded from providing input on security matters.

In retrospect, EO 81 shows striking parallels with Marcos Sr.’s pre-martial law actions. While the present context is distinct from the early 1970s, the systematic exclusion of dissenting voices and centralizing decision-making power reminiscent of Marcos Sr.’s strategies, fostering an echo chamber that prioritizes alignment with the executive’s agenda over diverse, critical perspectives, remains a common thread. Note that the prelude to martial law in 1972 was marked by the narrowing of power to a loyal circle of allies, the sidelining of institutional checks and balances, and the use of national security rhetoric to justify authoritarian measures.

Conclusion

Indeed, as history has shown, centralization of power and authority, when unchecked, can erode institutional safeguards and lead to far-reaching consequences. Hence, the historical parallel serves as a cautionary tale, underscoring the importance of vigilance to ensure that policy and structural reforms in government remain aligned with democratic principles and the public interest.

Thus, it is essential to monitor how this EO 81 reorganization of the NSC affects the balance of power in the Philippines and its implications for democratic processes. More importantly, the ability of democratic institutions and civil society to counterbalance executive overreach will be critical in ensuring that actions like EO 81 do not pave the way for authoritarian governance. This underscores the importance of vigilance to prevent history from repeating itself in a way that undermines democratic principles and processes.

Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/01/11/opinion/columns/is-history-repeating-itself-is-eo-81-a-prelude-to-martial-law/2036743

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD), Peking University, Beijing, China. Currently, she is a Senior Researcher of the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) and a Senior Research Fellow of the Global Governance Institution (GGI). Prof. Anna Uy taught Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, Southeast Asia, and China Studies. She is a researcher-writer, academic, and consultant on a wide array of issues. She has worked as a consultant with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other local and international NGOs.