Some friends have asked me for my thoughts on the speech delivered by Vice Premier He Lifeng at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026 in Davos, Switzerland, which is ongoing. Here are some of my impressions:
He Lifeng’s speech deliberately operates at two levels: (a) Global level (Davos rhetoric): defend multilateralism, free trade, WTO rules; and (b) Regional level (Asia-Pacific reality): deepen integration where rules-based trade is still expanding
The Asia-Pacific is where China’s vision of “universally beneficial and inclusive globalization” is already being operationalized, not merely discussed. In other words: Davos is the argument; Asia-Pacific is the proof.
When China now speaks of “further opening up,” it is no longer primarily aimed at Western economies. Instead, it is re-centered on regional and South–South integration, especially through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), ASEAN–China production networks, and Asia-Pacific supply chain re-anchoring.
He Lifeng’s emphasis on service liberalization, imports, consumption upgrading, and industrial specialization aligns almost perfectly with Asia-Pacific economic complementarities, not trans-Atlantic ones.
When He Lifeng defends WTO rules, MFN (most favored nation) erosion concerns, and fragmentation risks, he implicitly positions RCEP as the region’s stabilizing mechanism. Why this matters:
• RCEP is rules-based, but not ideologically conditional
• It lowers transaction costs across East and Southeast Asia
• It locks in China’s openness without political securitization
Thus, China’s “opening” is no longer hostage to U.S. or EU political moods; it is institutionalized at the regional level.
He Lifeng’s warning that “trade issues often become security hurdles” speaks directly to U.S.-led decoupling, but his solution is not confrontation. Instead, China is:
• expanding regional value chains
• deepening intermediate goods trade
• strengthening logistics, ports, and digital trade rules in Asia
The Asia-Pacific becomes a buffer zone against forced fragmentation. This is not bloc formation; it is economic gravity at work.
For Southeast Asia, the speech translates into deeper China–ASEAN industrial integration, stronger services, tourism, digital economy, and green supply chains, and more stable investment expectations. China’s opening is now ASEAN-centric, not Western-dependent. This is especially relevant for: manufacturing relocation, energy transition supply chains, and digital services and e-commerce. In practical terms, ASEAN becomes the hinge between China’s domestic circulation and international circulation.
He Lifeng’s repeated “win-win” framing is often dismissed rhetorically by some Western countries, but in the context of Asia-Pacific integration, it takes material form. China runs a services trade deficit with the region. ASEAN economies capture value-added stages, not just raw exports. Middle-income economies climb supply chains rather than being locked out. This is why Asia-Pacific states remain pragmatic, even amid geopolitical pressure.
Taken together, the speech signals that China’s further opening will be regional-first, rules-based, and demand-driven. Asia-Pacific integration is China’s insurance policy against global fragmentation. Multilateralism survives not through universal consensus, but through functional regional clusters. China is not abandoning globalization; it is re-anchoring it in the Asia-Pacific.
Bottom line: He Lifeng’s Davos speech provides the ideological and normative justification for what China is already doing in the Asia-Pacific: deepening regional integration, institutionalizing openness, and turning Asia into the main engine of global economic stability in an era of Western uncertainty.
Furthermore, He Lifeng’s Davos speech is a disciplined, an intervention aimed at rescuing economic globalization from its geopolitical hijacking, while positioning China as the most reliable defender of economic normalcy in an increasingly abnormal world.
It was a calm speech, but it exuded confidence. It was in some way repetitive because it is doctrinal. And it is persuasive not to governments, but to the forces that ultimately shape economic reality.
Lifeng’s speech was not a defense of China. It was an attempt to re-center global economic legitimacy away from coercive power politics and back toward rule-based multilateralism, while subtly reframing China from “systemic challenger” to “system stabilizer” at a moment of Western fragmentation.
Li Feng’s speech is a Re-legitimation One. At first glance, the speech sounds familiar: free trade, multilateralism, win-win cooperation, openness.
But analytically, its true purpose is reputational and systemic, not transactional. He Lifeng has done three things simultaneously:
1. Re-legitimizing globalization itself, not just China’s role in it
2. Delegitimizing unilateral economic coercion without naming offenders
3. Positioning China as the adult in the room while others politicize trade
Li Feng was no longer merely defending China’s interests. He was defending the operating system of the global economy: economic globalization, free trade, and multilateralism.
The speech was also a subtle, gentle, yet sharp indictment of Weaponized Interdependence. Key lines like;
• “Tariffs and trade wars have no winners.”
• “Trade issues often become security hurdles.”
• “A handful of countries should not enjoy privileges based on their strength.”
• “The world must not return to the law of the jungle.”
This framing is designed to resonate not with Washington, but with the Global South, mid-sized trading states, and European business and industrial actors are fatigued by uncertainty.
The WTO Section Is the Speech’s Moral Core, repositioning itself as a system reformer, not a system abuser
The treatment of China–US relations is notable for what it avoids: no apology, no concession, and no moral equivalence. Instead, calm tone, process-oriented language, and emphasis on “equal-footed consultation.” This signals strategic patience, not weakness. The message is: Cooperation is possible—but only without hierarchy. That is a red line, politely drawn.
The long section on 5.4% average growth, an RMB 140 trillion economy, innovation capacity, the green transition, and the 15th Five-Year Plan is not meant to impress economists. It is meant to convey stability, continuity, and governability. In a volatile world, China is presenting itself as predictable, planned, administratively coherent, resilient, strong, and a robust economy. That matters enormously to European capitals.
At its deepest level, the speech is about who gets to define “normal” in the global economy. China argues that multilateral rules, openness, and cooperation are the norm. And that coercion, bloc politics, and economic securitization are dangerous deviations, not the new normal. This is not revisionism, it is counter-revisionism.
