The price of US friendship: Tariffs, subservience and the illusion of alliance

THE July 9, 2025 letter from US President Donald Trump to President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. outlines a blunt and coercive economic ultimatum: beginning Aug. 1, the US will impose a 20-percent tariff on all Philippine exports to address what Trump calls an “unfair” trade relationship and a “significant trade deficit.” Goods transshipped to evade tariffs will be met with even harsher penalties.

Trump accuses the Philippines of maintaining tariff and non-tariff barriers that make the trade relationship “far from reciprocal” and “unsustainable,” positioning the deficit as a national security threat to the US. He extends a conditional reprieve, offering to lift tariffs if Philippine firms relocate manufacturing to the US, sweetened by expedited approvals for investments on American soil. Conversely, any retaliatory tariffs from Manila will be matched and exceeded by the US.

Though framed in diplomatic language, the letter starkly reveals a transactional and punitive approach to trade. Trump’s strategy reduces the alliance to a commercial quid pro quo, using friendship and partnership as leverage for economic subjugation. The letter reflects a broader shift from multilateral cooperation toward bilateral coercion, where the cost of resistance is isolation, and the price of compliance is the loss of sovereignty.

Trump’s misguided assertion

Trump’s assertion that the US-Philippine trade relationship is “far from reciprocal” and his tariff threats toward the Philippines lie in the distortion of the concept of “reciprocity” in trade, which is not only misleading but intellectually dishonest when examined in context and crumbles under scrutiny.

First is the mischaracterization of tariff structures. Trump’s claim that the trade relationship is “far from reciprocal” and that the US suffers due to Philippine tariffs and barriers is not backed by empirical trade data. Philippine tariffs are not excessively protectionist. As a developing economy and a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Philippines generally complies with the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) bound tariff rates.

The average MFN applied tariff rate in the Philippines is approximately 6.3 percent, while the US average is around 2.3 percent. However, this is typical for developing economies, rather than being uniquely unfair or hostile. They are not apples-to-apples. Comparing these figures in isolation, without regard for developmental disparities, is intellectually dishonest. The Philippines, as a lower-middle-income economy, maintains tariffs that are well within WTO norms for its development level. The US, on the other hand, is a highly industrialized economy with far more advanced market structures. To ignore these developmental disparities in pursuit of numerical symmetry is to wield economic policy with a sledgehammer rather than a scalpel.

Also, the US has a persistent global trade deficit, not just with the Philippines. The bilateral trade deficit between the US and the Philippines is relatively modest compared to other countries, such as China, Mexico or Vietnam. In 2023, for instance, US imports from the Philippines were valued at approximately $15 billion, while exports to the Philippines were around $9 billion, resulting in a deficit, albeit not an insignificant one or a structurally damaging one, but hardly catastrophic. Note that such an imbalance is not due to “unfair” trade practices, but rather to structural economic forces, including consumption patterns, global value chains and capital movements. Yet Trump paints this as deliberate exploitation by the Philippines when, in reality, it is a natural feature of global trade. What Trump refuses to acknowledge is that trade deficits reflect structural global dynamics, not simple acts of “unfairness” or the Philippines engaging in unfair practices.

Economic coercion and weaponizing ‘non-tariff barriers’

Similarly, encouraging Filipino firms/manufacturers to shift operations to the US under tariff threats is economic coercion. Filipino firms/manufacturers are given two choices: move their manufacturing to the US, or face tariffs. And should the Philippines retaliate with its own tariffs? Trump vows to match them and add another 20 percent. This is less a trade strategy than a form of economic blackmail, which is not only a coercive demand but also undermines the Philippines’ economic sovereignty, as well as its development goals. In any case, it will dismantle the Philippines’ domestic value chains and industrial sovereignty under the guise of restoring fairness. This proposal promotes economic extraction and dependency, rather than genuine partnership or friendship.

Truth be told, this is less a diplomatic overture and more a blunt instrument of economic intimidation. This isn’t negotiation; it’s extortion. Worse, it signals a worldview where the US views its allies not as equals, but as dependencies to be disciplined, rather than engaged. Forcing developing nations to offshore their own industries to the US while gutting their domestic value chains is a blueprint for dependency, not development.

Further muddying the waters, Trump vaguely accuses the Philippines of imposing “non-tariff barriers” without evidence. Yet, the Philippines, like most nations, implements standard regulatory practices related to health, safety and labeling, rather than discriminatory protectionism. There is little to no substantiation that US companies face unusual or politically motivated barriers in the Philippine market.

Conclusion

Trump’s recent tariff threats against the Philippines offer more than just a window into his economic thinking; they serve as a cautionary tale about the perils of transactional diplomacy masquerading as a strategic alliance. At its core, Trump’s logic is dangerously simplistic: it conflates reciprocity in trade with identical tariff rates, without considering the vast asymmetries in development, industrial maturity and historical circumstances between nations. Expecting a developing country like the Philippines to mirror US trade policy is akin to expecting a bicycle to race a Formula One car on the same track in terms of speed and performance, a false equivalence rooted in arrogance rather than sound analysis.

Although Trump’s letter is cloaked in the language of cooperation, its message is unmistakably coercive. What emerges is a more profound and unsettling truth: that under Trump 2.0, alliance solidarity and diplomacy are no longer rooted in trust, mutual respect or shared strategic values. It now comes with an invoice. Tariffs, not treaties, have become the new currency of friendship. The “ironclad” promises once held up as hallmarks of US commitment now appear to be little more than brittle slogans, easy to recite, but quick to crumble under pressure.

Such maneuvers strip away the illusion of alliance and expose the asymmetry at its core. They raise an urgent question for Philippine policymakers: Is the US alliance a genuine shield, or merely a tool to cloak deeper, self-serving interests of the “empire of chaos”? The answer may well define the nation’s foreign policy path in the years to come.

Moreover, if the United States truly values its alliances, it must abandon the hubris of transactional diplomacy in favor of genuine economic respect. Friendship, whether between individuals or nations, is not about how much you can extract, but about how much you are willing to grow together.

As Henry Kissinger once warned, “To be an enemy of the United States can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal.” That warming insight now echoes with eerie clarity in Manila. For if this is how Washington treats its friends, one must shudder to imagine the fate reserved for those it deems expendable.

Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/07/12/opinion/columns/the-price-of-us-friendship-tariffs-subservience-and-the-illusion-of-alliance/2147767

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy

Prof. Anna Rosario Malindog-Uy is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Institute of South-South Cooperation and Development (ISSCAD), Peking University, Beijing, China. Currently, she is a Senior Researcher of the South China Sea Probing Initiative (SCSPI) and a Senior Research Fellow of the Global Governance Institution (GGI). Prof. Anna Uy taught Political Science, International Relations, Development Studies, European Studies, Southeast Asia, and China Studies. She is a researcher-writer, academic, and consultant on a wide array of issues. She has worked as a consultant with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other local and international NGOs.