US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s accusatory remarks on the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue against China, with reference to the South China Sea (SCS) and Taiwan, and his request that Asian countries increase their military spending to 5 percent must be understood not only in the language of deterrence but also through the lens of strategic provocation and power projection. His reaffirmation of U.S. military deployments and joint exercises signals more than defense; it reflects Washington’s persistent attempt to reassert hegemonic influence in an increasingly multipolar Asia-Pacific.
Disguise
It is important to underscore that the SCS disputes primarily concern overlapping territorial claims and maritime entitlements among littoral states. These disputes over sovereignty and maritime delimitation do not, in practice, obstruct the freedom of navigation (FONOPs) and overflight as guaranteed under international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To date, and correct me if I’m mistaken, no verified public incidents have indicated that FONOPs or overflight has been denied or obstructed due to the ongoing disputes in the SCS. In fact, ensuring unimpeded navigation and overflight is a shared interest among all stakeholders, regional claimants, including China, as well as extra-regional powers with commercial or strategic interests in the area. To that end, all countries continue to enjoy the unhindered passage of vessels and aircraft through these waters and airspace.
This raises a critical question: If FONOPs are not actually under threat, then what explains the U.S.’s sustained and increasingly militarized presence in the region, specifically in the SCS? The invocation of FONOPs as justification for frequent naval patrols and war games seems increasingly hollow, especially when these actions appear to stoke tensions rather than reduce them. Furthermore, the United States is not a claimant state in the South China Sea (SCS). It’s not even a signatory to UNCLOS. Is its military presence, via FONOPs, EDCA expansion in the Philippines, and deeper QUAD and AUKUS engagements about deterrence and preserving peace and stability? Or is it a strategic containment policy, if not outright provocation, directed at China under the guise of protecting FONOPs?
Moreover, Hegseth’s demand for 5 percent of the GDP on defense painted an image of the US defense secretary as akin to an arms dealer or broker rather than an envoy to the 2025 Shang-rila Dialogue in Singapore, reflecting a militarist escalation strategy, not de-escalation. Most ASEAN countries spend less than 2 percent of their GDP on defense, for this is not the utmost priority, but rather spending on the social welfare of people, economic development, and prosperity. Pushing for 5 percent is essentially asking regional states to bankrupt themselves militarily for any potential conflict they did not start and do not benefit from.
Conclusion
In the short and long term, the Asia Pacific doesn’t need more warships or war games; it needs mutual restraint, regional autonomy, and a renewed emphasis on diplomacy, not gunboat grandstanding.
Source: The Lobbyist
https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/from-envoy-to-arms-dealer
