AT the 46th Asean Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on May 26, 2025, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. emphasized the urgent need for Asean members and China to expedite the adoption of a legally binding code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea (SCS). He said: “We underscore the urgent need to accelerate the adoption of a legally binding code of conduct in the SCS. This safeguards maritime rights, promotes stability, and prevents miscalculations at sea.”
Thus, Marcos warned that, without a binding COC framework, the region remains vulnerable to escalating tensions and potential conflicts. Looking ahead, the Philippines aims to finalize the COC by 2026, coinciding with its upcoming Asean chairmanship.
While President Marcos’ statement advocating for peace and a rules-based resolution in the SCS is, on the surface, a welcome and positive gesture, the real question that lingers is whether this rhetoric will be matched by consistent and credible action. Many observers hope it is not mere lip service or a public relations maneuver to appease critics both at home and abroad, especially given the growing perception of strategic incoherence within his administration.
Strategic incoherence
This skepticism is not unfounded. Despite voicing diplomatic intentions, the Marcos administration continues to deepen its military engagements with the United States and its allies, conducting large-scale joint military exercises in proximity to the disputed SCS and the Taiwan Strait, moves that Beijing inevitably views as provocative.
For instance, just recently, massive joint war/military drills like the Balikatan military exercises between the Philippines and the US, and Kamandag 9, featuring US, Japanese, South Korean and British forces deploying advanced weapons near Taiwan and in the SCS, were hosted back-to-back by the Philippines, which sends a contradictory signal. To both Asean and non-Asean actors, these drills are unmistakably aimed at containing China insofar as the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the US is concerned. Undoubtedly, the optics alone fuel Beijing’s accusations of duplicity.
This leads to credibility erosion. Beijing and regional countries are losing trust in Manila’s diplomatic overtures. Asean unity could also be strained, with other member states viewing the Philippines as undermining regional stability by importing extra-regional powers into the dispute. Likewise, the Philippines risks becoming a proxy battleground, as an increased US military footprint invites retaliatory scrutiny or even preemptive escalation from China.
The bottom line is that Manila is playing a dangerous game of mixed signals. This approach may buy short-term flexibility but is unsustainable in the long run. Without a clear, coherent and independent foreign policy anchored on neutrality, regional trust and strategic autonomy, Manila risks becoming a pawn in the broader US-China chessboard, a pawn easily sacrificed when the game gets too hot.
In retrospect, this contradictory approach, advocating for the early conclusion of the COC while simultaneously entrenching militarily, undermines the Philippines’ credibility and casts doubt on the sincerity of its diplomatic posture. If uncorrected, such strategic incoherence signaling risks not only inflaming tensions but also exposing the Philippines to accusations of duplicity on the international stage. This epitomizes a precarious balancing act that borders on strategic incoherence.
COC in the SCS
The China-Asean COC in the SCS is not a solution nor will it resolve the overlapping sovereignty/territorial and maritime rights claims in the contested waters among claimant countries. It is not a tool to determine who owns which island, reef or maritime zone. Instead, the COC is designed as a preventive diplomatic and crisis management mechanism/tool, a set of rules, norms and procedures to: reduce the risk of conflict, manage tensions and incidents, and promote maritime cooperation, despite unresolved territorial disputes.
Nevertheless, as far as the Philippines is concerned, along the process of the COC negotiations, a complication might arise due to the two recently enacted Philippine laws, the Maritime Zones Act (MZA) and the Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act (ASLA). These domestic laws aim to strengthen the country’s legal maritime claims in the SCS. However, these laws carry critical geopolitical and diplomatic implications that could complicate, rather than contribute to, the “friendly teamwork” required to finalize a meaningful COC. How and why?
First, the MZA and ASLA are unilateral laws grounded in the Philippines’ interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos). They aim to clarify baselines, internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic sea lanes. However, by legislating unilaterally in a region rife with overlapping claims, the Philippines risks undermining the multilateral spirit of the COC negotiations and appearing to preempt the outcome of future diplomacy.
Second, the MZA and ASLA set a precedent that could encourage Vietnam, Malaysia, China and Brunei to pass similar unilateral and more aggressive national maritime laws, redefining their own claims and operational zones. This could trigger a legalistic arms race, a collage of contradictory laws with each state enforcing its maritime regimes, making consensus on a unified and negotiated COC nearly impossible. This trend encourages fragmented interpretations, weakening Asean’s coherence and bargaining power.
Lest we forget the COC is supposed to de-escalate tensions in the SCS. If every claimant starts issuing domestic laws asserting exclusive zones or regulating passage unilaterally, the COC risks being reduced to a symbolic gesture.
Third, while the Philippines invokes Unclos through these laws, it selectively enforces interpretations that serve its national interest. This invites accusations from other claimant states of “double standards” or weaponizing Unclos while rejecting a broader cooperative legal framework.
For instance, the ASLA regulates innocent and archipelagic sea lane passage, which is a sensitive matter. If interpreted restrictively, it could be viewed by other maritime powers (not just China) and even regional countries as impeding freedom of navigation. Asean claimant states and extra-regional users like the US and Japan may see this as a move toward nationalizing global or regional commons, contradicting Unclos guarantees of transit passage or what you call innocent passage.
Furthermore, the MZA and the ASLA could undermine diplomatic flexibility in the COC negotiations. These laws could tie the hands of Filipino negotiators/diplomats in the COC talks/negotiations. Other claimant states also perceived that the Philippines, through these domestic legislations, is prejudging overlapping claims or asserting its claims before the conclusion of multilateral agreements. Hence, this complicates confidence-building measures with Asean and China, which seek to avoid inflaming tensions through unilateral moves. Essentially, these laws are like drawing a red line with a crayon on a world map; it makes domestic audiences feel good, but achieves nothing in the real power dynamics of the SCS and geopolitically speaking.
Conclusion
The bottom line is that the COC should not be a symbolic or rhetorical document. Its true value lies in its operational utility, providing predictability, transparency and rules-based restraint in a maritime arena fraught with overlapping claims and major power strategic interests.
In essence, while who owns the SCS remains contested, the COC must ensure that states’ behavior in disputed waters is governed by common, peaceful and agreed-upon norms, rules and regulations.
Moreover, the Philippines should avoid undermining its own diplomacy through excessive militarization and external alignment with the US.
Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/06/07/opinion/columns/talking-peace-hosting-war-games-strategic-incoherence-at-sea-and-mixed-signals/2128870
