By Gustavo Ng
This article has been translated from Spanish. We apologize for any unintended translation errors.
Interview with Filipina expert Anna Malindog-Uy
For more than three decades, Filipina Anna Malindog-Uy has focused on the South China Sea, considering it “one of the three most sensitive and persistent flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific.” In this interview, she offers a broad overview of US-China tensions
across the Pacific Ocean, with a focus on the South China Sea and the Philippines’ involvement.
Malindog-Uy’s career spans academia, politics, consulting, media, and civil society, with research on the political, strategic, and economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region. She has served as Vice President for External Affairs at the Asian Century Philippine Strategic Studies Institute (ACPSSI), Secretary General of the Association for Philippines-China Understanding (APCU), and is a member of the Global Governance Institution think tank. She is a columnist for The Manila Times and other media outlets.
—What personal and academic experiences led you to focus on the PhilippinesChina-US relationship in the South China Sea?
—The South China Sea (SCS) has been a central theme throughout my academic life. Even as an undergraduate and graduate student in Political Science at the University of the Philippines Diliman, I understood early on that the SCS was one of the three most sensitive and persistent flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region. For decades, scholars and policymakers have insisted that managing these disputes peacefully, diplomatically, and responsibly is essential to avoid dangerous escalations between the claimant states. This perspective shaped not only my academic interests but also my lifelong commitment to promoting a nuanced and evidence-based discourse on the topic. My broader academic focus has always involved political comparisons between China and the United States, eventually extending to the Philippines-China-United States triangular relationship. For a Filipina scholar, this is neither unusual nor incidental: it is a natural intellectual trajectory. China is our closest civilizational neighbor, a country with which we share centuries of cultural and people-to-people ties. The United States, for its part, is a former colonial power and remains our principal military ally under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.
— In his career he has observed that the Philippines has been gaining a foothold in the tension
between China and the US.
Today, as the strategic rivalry between the US and China intensifies, the Philippines has become an increasingly critical arena —some would say a battlefield— of this power struggle. Our geopolitical position, the treaties to which we are committed, and the shifting foreign policy decisions have profound implications not only for regional stability but also for the security and daily well-being of Filipinos. For these reasons, for me, the study of Philippines-US-China relations is no longer a purely academic matter. It is a necessity.
Nationally, Filipino citizens need to be properly informed, with analytical foundations and a critical awareness of the external forces shaping the country’s strategic environment. My work—which encompasses political science, development studies, international relations, and now economics—aims precisely to contribute to that broader understanding: to bring clarity amid the noise, context amid the rhetoric, and sober analysis amid the pressures of the great powers that increasingly define our region.
— What economic, institutional, and military transformations have turned the South
China Sea into a point of confrontation between powers?
The Southern Ocean became a focal point of tension not only because of its geography or old disputes, but because three major transformations converged: economic restructuring, institutional changes and failures, and military reconfiguration. Together, these factors turned a peripheral maritime space into a central arena of rivalry between great powers.
— What were those transformations of the South China Sea like?
—Since the 1990s, China’s economic rise has transformed the Southern Ocean (SCS) into a critical corridor for its energy trade and imports. Approximately one-third of global shipping passes through these waters; for China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations), it is the main lifeline of maritime trade. As China transitioned from a continental power to one focused on maritime dominance, it redefined the SCS from a vague claim to “historical waters” to a core national interest, closely tied to regime legitimacy, economic security, and national rejuvenation. Furthermore, energy resources—some proven, many speculative—became energy security assets, even if their actual economic value is less than the political symbolism they carry. The overexploitation of coastal waters has pushed regional states and local communities to look outward. Declining fisheries and food security concerns have made control of fishing grounds politically sensitive; Governments increasingly resorted to coast guards and maritime militias to assert their claims.
The expansion of the “blue economy” has elevated the strategic value of previously insignificant small geographical features. East Asia’s highly integrated production networks depend on maritime traffic through the Southern Ocean. Any disruption threatens not only regional economies but also global markets. This has created a space where economic interdependence clashes with security concerns.
— What institutional changes have been taking place?
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) transformed the oceans into a structured legal space: territorial seas, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and continental shelves. This gave coastal states legal incentives to formalize and expand their claims. US-led alliances and their “center and radio” system, along with Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), are presented as defenses of the rules-based order. From the Chinese perspective, these alliances and institutions appear as a containment architecture disguised as liberal rhetoric. What Washington calls “stabilizing,” Beijing sees as provocative and enclosing.
—And on the military front?
— Since the late 1990s, China has transformed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy and Air Force into modern, deep-sea capable forces. The SCS is central to its “near-sea defense/sea protection” strategy.
He built artificial islands with runways, radars, and missile systems, expanding the Coast Guard and maritime militia. The United States, for its part, intensified its “pivot” to Asia, increasing FONOPs (Freedom of Navigation Operations, Freedom of Navigation operations, rotational deployments, and exercises have transformed the South China Sea into a theater where U.S. and Chinese forces track, monitor, and signal each other. The expansion of U.S. access agreements—such as the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) sites in the Philippines—Japan’s growing role, and Australia’s increased involvement have turned the South China Sea into a networked operational space. The result is a structural clash where economic centrality, legal ambiguity, and military modernization intersect with nationalism and greatpower rivalry.
—What are the key political and military elements of the US plan to attack China in the Pacific?
The United States does not openly declare a “plan to attack China,” but it possesses contingency plans that reveal clear strategic pillars. Key political factors to consider are the network of alliances as its strategic backbone; the “rules-based order” narrative, which legitimizes its military presence; the military-industrial drive and domestic policy based on the “Chinese threat”; and economic and technological tools (controls, sanctions, “risk reduction”).
—And specifically the military codes?
— Consideration must be given to maritime and air dominance through submarines, stealth, aircraft carriers, and missiles; the highly unstable first-strike/counterstrike dynamics; and an inside/outside force structure that makes allied territories targets. The strategy also includes information, cyber, and space warfare, with nuclear deterrence as a backdrop. Taken together, this creates a high-stakes security dilemma.
— Does the US administration have a long-term strategy for the region, or does
it act reactively and episodically?
— Both. There is a long-term strategic framework, but implementation is highly reactive, driven by crises and election cycles. The long-term strategy has been consistent from Clinton to Biden, and includes the decision to prevent another power from dominating Asia, keeping maritime routes open, maintaining alliances as a backbone, and protecting U.S. technological and economic primacy.
—And what are the most immediate actions?
— In that case, politics is influenced by electoral cycles every two to four years, through bureaucratic fragmentation, attention-consuming crisis management, and mixed signals to allies. From Southeast Asia, the US is perceived as an actor characterized by peaks of attention followed by periods of neglect. An actor with strong symbolism, but little consistency.
— What internal limitations in the U.S. could hinder or reverse a strong military commitment in the Pacific?
— There are many powerful limitations, ranging from fiscal pressures and budget wars to war fatigue after Iraq and Afghanistan, populist “America First” impulses, corporate interests with economic exposure to China, and political polarization that could lead to institutional paralysis. Domestic crises may also emerge, shifting the agenda inward and fostering civil-military caution regarding war with a nuclear partner. Some or all of these limitations could force adjustments or a partial withdrawal.
— How do you assess the use of non-traditional partnerships —logistical agreements, access to bases, technology transfer— in the US strategy?
— These are silent but central pillars of the US strategy. They offer forward presence at low political cost, increase interoperability and technological dependence, and share costs and risks with partners.
— What is the cost to the host states?
— Greater strategic vulnerability, less political autonomy, domestic tensions over sovereignty, and erosion of ASEAN multilateralism.
— How are you viewing China’s current strategy in the South China Sea?
— It is rational in strategic terms, but assertive in rules and highly risky. It leverages proximity, growing power, and gray zone tactics, but erodes regional trust and increases the likelihood of miscalculations.
— And what about the role of judicial decisions and international organizations in the
South China Sea?
— Their role is symbolically significant, but largely ineffective in changing the facts on the ground. Court decisions clarify the law, but do not enforce it, and this is because international organizations are political arenas, not arbiters. ASEAN, for example, provides dialogue, but not coercive mechanisms, and the UN is limited by the Chinese veto. In short, they shape narratives, but do not stop island building, blockades, or maritime coercion.
— Let’s return to why the Philippines became central to American influence.
— This can be explained by five key reasons. First, the strategic geographic position between Taiwan and the South China Sea (SCS). Second, the EDCA sites that restore military access without formal bases. The operational relevance for contingencies in Taiwan and the SCS must also be considered. Furthermore, there is a political alignment under Marcos Jr. (Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the current president of the Philippines). Finally, there is a symbolic and normative value linked to the 2016 arbitration ruling. Thus, the Philippines is now an operational backbone, a political partner, and a key narrative element.
— How would you describe the current Philippine government’s negotiations from this central position?
— These negotiations are maximalist in terms of alignment, minimal in terms of balance, and weak in leveraging resources. The focus has shifted from hedging to acting as a first-line ally, prioritizing military over economic considerations. With China, diplomacy is reactive, proceeding on an incident-by-incident basis. Too much is conceded without demanding proportionate concessions, the discourse reflects US-Japan narratives rather than a genuine agenda, and the risks to security and domestic policy are underestimated.
— You mentioned ASEAN as a space for dialogue. How do you see the role of that association in this context?
— As I said, ASEAN is indispensable as a stage, but weak as a helmsman. It is important insofar as it keeps diplomatic channels open, but its consensus rule and the diversity of interests limit its capacity for action. The COC (Code of Conduct in the South China Sea) process is moving forward, but slowly and without binding mechanisms, functioning as a partial buffer against bipolarity, but not as a guarantor of security. It is a shaper of norms, not a crisis manager.
Source: Tektonikos
https://tektonikos.website/mar-del-sur-de-china-un-escenario-tensado-por-estados-unidos/
