The South China Sea (SCS) has become the crossroads where great-power rivalry meets. China’s strategy in these waters is slow-burning, patient, disciplined, and multidimensional: economic incentives married with calibrated and restrained assertiveness. It’s a that is neither impulsive nor chaotic, and certainly not reactive, but definitely rational. It is a long-term statecraft.
By contrast, under Marcos Jr., Manila’s approach to the SCS dispute with China looks improvised. Each maritime clash triggers a predictable ritual—diplomatic noise/protests, hotline calls, statements of condemnation—yet none of these produce durable outcomes. There is no architecture for managing tensions, no built-in reciprocity, no enforceable commitments linking Filipino concessions to Chinese restraint or cooperation. Dialogue becomes damage control or political grandstanding, not strategy.
Moreover,Washington has a long-term Indo-Pacific design that integrates military posture, economic architecture, and alliance rebuilding. Manila, however, treats U.S. requests as favors to be granted rather than leverage to extract transformative gains in industry, technology, and national defense. Meanwhile, Beijing is executing a patient playbook, while Manila responds episodically.
The paradox: The Philippines sits at the center of Indo-Pacific geopolitics but negotiates as if it lives at the margins. The tragic irony: the Philippines is now geopolitically indispensable, yet diplomatically underperforming.
Weaknesses
The Marcos Jr. administration’s approach to the SCS dispute reflects four core weaknesses: First, Manila has transformed itself from a hedger to a frontline ally, tilting hard toward Washington and its partners. Second, the strategy is security-heavy and economics-light. The Philippines surrendered unprecedented military access to the U.S. yet failed to demand matching investments in industry, technology, and economic resilience. Third, diplomacy with China remains reactive, crisis-driven, and disconnected from an overarching framework linking de-escalation to joint development or rules-of-the-road agreements. And fourth, Manila practices poor conditionality. Instead of saying to the U.S., “More access requires more investment, more protection, more guarantees,” Marcos granted concessions upfront. Instead of telling China, “Cooperation requires restraint,”Marcos adopted a belligerent stance toward the SCS dispute with China, failing to demand calibrated reciprocal steps.
The result? Narrative alignment with Washington replaces autonomous agenda-setting. The Marcos government parrots U.S.–Japan-Australia-UK talking points about a “rules-based order,” signaling to ASEAN countries and China alike that Manila has traded independence for alignment. Worst of all, Marcos Jr. underplays domestic risk—constitutional questions, sovereignty, independence, public consent, economic fallout, and the reality that EDCA sites will be primary targets should conflict erupt.
Conclusion
In short, under Marcos, the Philippines negotiates like a grateful U.S. vassal state, not as a strategically essential actor it is supposed to be. Hence, for the next top leader of the country, he or she must understand that the Philippines demands a tougher bargaining posture rooted in reciprocity, conditionality, and strategic autonomy, smarter hedging, and a foreign policy that is independent and treats geography not as fate but as power. Right now, the Philippines is squandering it.
Source: The Lobbyist
https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/center-of-gravity-nowhere-in-strategy-how-ph-is-squandering-its-strategic-geography
