ON Sept. 27, 2025, I was invited to speak at the symposium “Retrospect and Prospect: Fifty Years of Philippines-China Relations” held at Jinan University in Guangzhou, China. The event, co-organized by Jinan University, Ateneo de Manila University’s Chinese Studies Program, the Philippine Association for Chinese Studies and the Philippines-China Studies Center at Diliman College, gathered scholars, experts and practitioners from both countries to reflect on five decades of diplomatic engagement. Four thematic panels examined geopolitics, economic cooperation, cultural exchange and South China Sea (SCS) security, covering issues ranging from democracy and China policy to investment, media influence and shifting security dynamics.
My presentation, “Major Powers and the Philippines’ China Policy: Balancing Security, Sovereignty and Development,” was part of the panel on Contemporary Issues and Challenges. At the heart of the panel discussion were hard questions that Filipinos can no longer afford to dodge: How much do major powers dictate Manila’s foreign policy choices? Has the crisis of democracy at home weakened our ability to think independently abroad? What do decades or the historical trajectory of presidential China policies really teach us beyond shifting rhetoric and political posturing? And perhaps a deeper puzzle: the most uncomfortable question of all is whether the Philippines has ever had — or currently possesses — a coherent strategy or policy toward China, or are we being swept along by the currents of external pressure and domestic politics? These questions framed my discussion of the Philippines’ enduring strategic dilemma: how to defend sovereignty and strategic autonomy, safeguard national security/interests and pursue genuine economic development that directly benefits the Filipino people.
My presentation started with the context that the Philippines sits at the heart of a strategic maritime crossroads in the Indo-Pacific region. Our location makes it vital to sea lines of communication, trade flows and geopolitical rivalry. As a result, our policy toward China cannot be understood in isolation. It is shaped by the competing interests, pressures and opportunities presented by major powers, particularly the United States, China, Japan and, increasingly, NATO member states, Australia and India, among others. What’s at stake is SCS security, peace and stability, the country’s economic development and strategic autonomy.
Superpowers
Let me begin with the US. As a treaty ally since 1951, the US remains the country’s security anchor more prominently under Marcos Jr.’s presidency. Through the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement and the expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, which includes four additional sites, American forces now enjoy rotational access to strategic locations near Taiwan and the SCS. In addition, operations and military exercises resumed with joint patrols, scaled-up Balikatan exercises and a trilateral exercise with Japan. US freedom of navigation operations (Fonops), on the other hand, challenge China’s maritime claims in the SCS, and Manila thinks this provides deterrence. Yet all these also complicate diplomacy. Closer security alignment with Washington and the collective West often provokes sharper reactions from Beijing. And this is where our first dilemma lies: the Philippines relies on the US for defense and security, yet our economy and trade are deeply intertwined with China.
China, on the other hand, is both a neighbor and a claimant state in the SCS. On one side, the Philippines faces a continuing dispute with China in the SCS. On the other, China is our top trade partner, a key investor and a major player in infrastructure development under the Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing employs a dual strategy: inducements through economic opportunities/cooperation and maritime assertiveness regarding its claims in the SCS. This creates a push-and-pull dynamic in which the Philippine government weighs sovereignty and sovereign rights against economic pragmatism.
Middle powers
Japan enters the picture as both a trusted partner and a balancing force for Manila. From being the country’s largest source of official development assistance, it is now trying to position itself as a “security provider and defense collaborator,” expanding defense ties. The Reciprocal Access Agreement, the legal framework for military deployments and training, the first of its kind in Asia for Japan, along with joint maritime exercises, reflects Tokyo’s readiness to support Manila’s security and defense needs. Hence, Japan is not just offering financial assistance now, but Manila looks at it as an Asian counterbalance to China.
Other major powers also play crucial roles. Some NATO member states support the rules-based order and the 2016 arbitral victory under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos), while providing trade incentives. Australia, a growing strategic security partner of Manila, has strengthened joint exercises and trilateral cooperation with both the Philippines and the US through the annual defense dialogues, joint sea/air patrols in the SCS and participation in major military exercises with a focus and emphasis on the so-called rules-based order, Fonops, marine domain awareness and coalition operations with calibrated risks.
India, a hard power enabler, on the other hand, though less prominent, is deepening defense ties, as exemplified by the sale of BrahMos missiles, among others. Moreover, within Asean, especially SCS claimant states such as Vietnam and Malaysia, which also have disputes with China over the SCS, are natural partners in advocating for collective approaches. Nevertheless, they pursue a hedging strategy, with economic pragmatism at the helm, while safeguarding their national interests, sovereignty and strategic autonomy.
All of this leaves the Philippines with a strategic dilemma: the importance of China in the economic sphere, its reliance on the US for security and the constant risk of becoming a proxy battlefield in the US-China strategic rivalry.
Conclusion: Pathways
So, what pathways are open to us? First, a hedging strategy where, at its core, is a neutral, genuine and independent foreign policy, maintaining security cooperation and ties with the US, but not in the context of a treaty ally. This approach allows the country to have more leverage to maneuver among great power rivalries while engaging China trade-wise and economically. Second, multilateralism by anchoring the SCS disputes within Asean and international law (Unclos). Third, diversification by strengthening partnerships with Asean member states, as well as with key middle powers such as Japan, the European Union, Australia and India, among others, to reduce overdependence on the US, and by accessing memberships in emerging Global South-oriented multilateral organizations such as Brics and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization). And finally, domestic resilience can be achieved by investing in a self-reliant defense posture and armed forces, promoting/enhancing economic competitiveness, development and prosperity, and confronting the challenge of preserving strategic autonomy, independence and sovereignty to ensure that our national interests and security, not external competition, define our foreign policy choices.
As a country, we must navigate the currents of great power competition and strategic rivalry wisely and pragmatically. It is about ensuring that in the clash of giants, the voice of a nation like ours is not drowned out, but heard with clarity.
Bottom line, the Philippines doesn’t need a borrowed foreign policy. It needs one built and owned by Filipinos. Our greatest risk is not China or the US per se, but a foreign policy adrift without vision and not anchored in peace, our national interests and security.
Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/10/04/opinion/columns/superpowers-middle-powers-and-ph-china-policy/2194496
