ON Sept. 3, 2025, Beijing marked the 80th anniversary of the “Victory Against Japanese Aggression in WWII” with a grand commemoration and military parade. Far from mere remembrance, China unveiled its newest “intelligentized” warfare platforms — hypersonic missiles, unmanned swarms, electronic warfare brigades and cyber-integration modules — transforming history into a statement of modern power.
Just days earlier, the 25th SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) Summit in Tianjin (Aug. 31-Sept. 1, 2025) gathered Eurasian leaders, showcasing how far the global order is shifting eastward, even as the “collective West,” led by the United States, attempted to reframe the narrative from the sidelines.
Together, these events sent a single message: China is both a historical victor and a future architect of global order — militarily confident, institutionally networked and ideologically prepared to counter bloc and Cold War politics. The parade represented hard power diplomacy, while the SCO meeting embodied institutional diplomacy — Eurasian voices endorsing multipolarity, collective security and development alternatives.
For the Philippines, however, these moments were missed opportunities. By defaulting to Washington instead of engaging with history, diplomacy and multipolar platforms, Manila once again sidelined itself in an evolving balance of power, and such costs will echo for decades.
Beijing’s strategic theater
The parade was meant for multiple audiences. To domestic eyes, it reassured the Chinese people that the “century of humiliation” would not be repeated under the watch of the Communist Party of China. To external powers, it declared that China has leaped from being a victim of invasion in the 1930s to a state that now fields hypersonics, artificial intelligence and cyber forces capable of denying adversaries’ networks and challenging US dominance in the Pacific theater.
It was also deeply historical. By emphasizing China’s 35 million wartime casualties and role as the Eastern Front of the anti-fascist war, Beijing positioned itself as co-equal to the Western Allies in crafting the post-war global order. China remembers its history but also plays a role in shaping the present global security environment. In a world where Washington claims to defend a “rules-based order,” Beijing insists it is upholding the original order — UN sovereignty, noninterference and anti-fascist solidarity — against US unilateralism and hegemony.
Tianjin’s multipolar moment
If Beijing’s military parade was about history and hardware, the SCO Summit was about architecture — the architecture of a new world order. It symbolized the rise of parallel institutions where the West once dominated global governance; new multipolar world platforms are now being constructed, and China is at the helm.
With leaders from Eurasia, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East gathered, China and Russia emphasized the importance of collective security, energy cooperation and infrastructure connectivity. The symbolism was clear: while NATO and the US frame security through deterrence and exclusion, the SCO offers a framework of inclusivity rooted in nonalignment and multipolarity.
For many Global South states, this is increasingly attractive. The West’s sanctions-heavy playbook and selective memory of history contrasts with the SCO’s discourse of sovereignty, respect and win-win development. By aligning the commemorative legacy of World War II with today’s institutional alternatives, Beijing is scripting itself as both the custodian of the past and the broker of the future.
The Philippine blind spot
And here lies the tragedy: The Philippines was absent from both occasions. Both occasions were opportunities to recalibrate its foreign policy and to remind the world of its own sacrifices in WWII. The Philippines was no bystander. Filipino guerrillas fought side by side with Allied and Chinese forces. It suffered the Bataan Death March, and the Battle of Manila was devastating, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and the destruction of the capital. Yet while China amplified its role to consolidate global legitimacy, Manila is much distracted by parochial politics and dependent on alignment and subservience to Washington. This is definitely a missed opportunity to reaffirm solidarity with Asian neighbors which also endured Japan’s aggression, a gesture that could have strengthened regional bonds.
Manila’s absence at these very critical events was another blunder. The Philippines, squeezed between US tariffs and South China Sea tensions, could have at least explored SCO observer status, much like Asean counterparts, where trade, energy and infrastructure cooperation are increasingly being institutionalized. Even a symbolic presence would have signaled a willingness to engage multipolar platforms. Instead, Manila doubled down on being a “frontline state” in the US containment strategy against China, exposing itself to entanglement risks without broadening its economic or diplomatic options. This entrenches the Philippines in a dangerous binary — locked in Washington’s camp while the rest of Asia is moving into a multipolar world with China at the helm.
Lost opportunities, costly consequences
The twin occasions underline a sobering reality: history and geopolitics reward states that know how to project memory and seize the moment. China used the 80th “Victory” anniversary to reinforce domestic unity, shape international narratives and deter adversaries through an advanced military display. It utilized the SCO Summit to solidify partnerships, bolster institutions and provide alternatives to Western-led structures.
In this regard, the Philippines lost twice: first, by failing to amplify its own WWII legacy to assert a moral and historical role in global anti-fascist memory; and second, by failing to engage diplomatically with emerging multipolar institutions that could cushion its economy against US-China rivalry.
Instead of leveraging history and diversifying partnerships, Manila continues to walk the tightrope of dependency, surrendering agency to a foreign policy of reaction rather than initiative.
Furthermore, in terms of the symbolism, the Philippines missed at the V-military parade in Beijing the opportunity to stand alongside China, Vietnam and others to honor the sacrifices of WWII. Such symbolism would have cost little but yielded diplomatic goodwill. At Tianjin, Manila could have voiced its support for multipolar cooperation while still keeping its friendship with the US as a traditional ally. Even neutrality would have been read as pragmatism. Instead, Manila’s absence reinforced the perception of subservience.
Conclusion
The message from Beijing and Tianjin is unmistakable: History and power are tools of statecraft. China wields both with increasing sophistication — anchoring its legitimacy in the past while shaping institutions for the future.
To put it bluntly, the Philippines misread the moment. While China wove history and modernity into a powerful narrative of strength and legitimacy, Manila clung to a narrow script written in Washington.
These were not mere missed photo opportunities. They were strategic voids. Manila allowed itself to be marginalized at precisely the time when Asian voices must assert themselves. The result is not only lost influence but also heightened vulnerability.
The Philippines, despite its sacrifices during WWII and potential, remains absent from this narrative. And in international politics, absence is nothing but irrelevance.
Source: The Manila Times
https://www.manilatimes.net/2025/09/06/opinion/columns/phs-missed-opportunities-at-beijing-victory-parade-and-tianjin-sco-summit/2179759
