As the 17th BRICS Summit convenes in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on July 6–7, 2025, the evolving composition and growing appeal of the bloc underscore a significant shift in the global geopolitical and economic order. The recent inclusion of Vietnam as a BRICS partner country marks yet another milestone in the bloc’s expanding influence across Asia. Notably, several Asian nations, from West Asia to South and Southeast Asia, are increasingly aligning with BRICS as an alternative platform for development cooperation, financial reform, and strategic autonomy.
Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia has become a full member, while Malaysia and Thailand have joined as partner countries. This trend reflects a broader momentum. BRICS has grown from its original four founding members (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) to an expanded bloc of eleven, with numerous other countries expressing interest in joining. What explains this surge in interest, especially among countries in the Global South, is the BRICS’ appeal as a counterweight to Western-dominated institutions and its emphasis on multipolarity, inclusive development, and financial de-dollarization. Hence, BRICS offers an alternative path less constrained by traditional power hierarchies as it champions an alternative model of global governance based on mutual respect, sovereignty, and inclusive growth.
Against this backdrop, a crucial question arises: Will the Philippines, given its increasingly complex geopolitical posture, a country deeply entrenched in U.S.-led alliances yet grappling with developmental challenges and regional uncertainties, consider engaging with or eventually joining BRICS?
Possible, But Conditional
The Philippines’ entry into BRICS is not unthinkable, but would depend on several interlinked domestic and foreign policy factors.
First, it would require a recalibration of foreign policy priorities, balancing traditional alliances that may better represent the aspirations of the developing world. As a lower-middle-income economy, the Philippines shares common ground with BRICS states on poverty alleviation, digital inclusion, and climate vulnerability. Joining BRICS could also reduce overdependence on Western military and economic aid.
However, there are challenges. The strong U.S.-Philippines military alliance is a hurdle. The Philippines is a major non-NATO ally of the United States, hosting U.S. military bases under the EDCA. A shift toward BRICS could be viewed as geostrategic hedging, potentially straining ties with the U.S. The current Marcos Jr. administration leans pro-West or pro-U.S., to be more precise. A future leadership change, one that can wield a neutral, independent foreign policy and strategic autonomy, might favor a pivot toward BRICS. Currently, the Philippine foreign policy community remains fragmented, lacking a clear strategic roadmap for multipolarity or regional integration beyond ASEAN.
Conclusion:
Nevertheless, the Philippines, although not an immediate candidate, could pursue BRICS partnership status in the medium term, observing and learning from the experiences of Vietnam and Indonesia, and utilizing platforms like BRICS+ or New Development Bank partnerships to participate in pilot projects without a full political commitment. In the long run, a more multipolar-oriented and economically self-reliant Philippines, under a leadership that is willing to balance U.S.-China dynamics, may find BRICS alignment a natural fit.
Source: The Lobbyist
https://www.thelobbyist.biz/perspectives/article-details/prime%20insight/what-brics-means-for-southeast-asia-and-the-philippines
